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1 August 1996 
Court Clerk 
Utah State Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
RE: West Vallev City v Richard Norris. Appeal by West Valley City. Case No. 960151-CA. 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
I am writing in regards to the above matter. Appellee's brief was due in the above matter on 24 
July 1996. However, Appellee Richard Norris hereby advises that he will not file a response brief 
to that filed by West Valley City. 
I, as Mr. Norris' counsel, have spoken with him at length about the appeal and we have reached 
the conclusion that Mr. Norris' response to the specific issue addressed in the brief places him in 
a peculiar situation. The trial judge Judge Watson dismissed the misdemeanor charges for lack of 
jurisdiction due to the amounts he deemed to be at issue. He did so without addressing any of the 
other issues raised by Mr. Norris' counsel for dismissal of the case. 
However, even though a dismissal is normally in the best interests of a defendant, a dismissal in 
this case for lack of jurisdiction opens up the prospect of felony criminal charges being filed 
against Mr. Norris. Mr. Norris is, essentially, left with two equally untenable alternatives: argue 
that the Court's dismissal be upheld at the risk of having felony charges filed against him or that 
he should still face misdemeanor charges as argued by the West Valley City prosecutor's office. 
Neither alternative suits Mr. Norris and, therefore, he has chosen to not respond rather than be 
embroiled in this "catch 22". 
Very Truly Yours, 
C. DANNY FRAILER 
Attorney for Appellee 
Richard Norris 
P.S.: 
A copy of this letter has also been sent to the West Valley City Prosecutor's office. 
C. Danny Frazier 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Because this appeal is from the final judgment of the Third 
Circuit Court, the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction. UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3 (2) (d) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Did the trial judge correctly dismiss the charge 
against Appellee for lack of jurisdiction by interpreting that 
Section 76-10-1801 of the Utah Code required that the charges 
against Appellee be felonies rather than misdemeanors? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's interpretation of statutes 
is a question of law that is reviewed according to a correctness 
standard. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). The 
Utah Court of Appeals ureview[s] questions of law under a 
correction of error standard, without deference to the trial 
court." State v. Shipler, 869 P. 2d 968, 969 (Utah App. 
1994)(citation omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Constitution art. V, § 1. 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (Supp. 1995). 
RULES 
There are no procedural rules at issue in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal concerns the trial judge's dismissal of the 
charges against Appellant by ruling that § 76-10-1801(2) of the 
Utah Code required that the charges be felonies rather than 
misdemeanors. The charges were dismissed because the Circuit 
Court's jurisdiction is limited to misdemeanors. The trial judge's 
interpretation of § 76-10-1801(2) violates the Utah Constitution 
because it denies the prosecutor discretion to determine what 
charges to file. A copy of the trial judge's ruling is included as 
an Addendum to this Brief. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
On December 20, 1994, Appellant Richard Norris, ("Norris") was 
charged with violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801, Communications 
Fraud. Four misdemeanor charges were filed. Because of incessant 
delays, the trial process took an extraordinarily long time. (See 
Docket, West Valley City v. Norris at 1-3 (hereafter "Docket")). 
In October of 1995, Norris filed a motion to strike the 
2 
information. The trial judge struck the original information as 
defective. (Docket, supra at 3) . Norris also filed a motion to 
strike the amended information. The trial judge allowed the 
parties to prepare memoranda on that motion, and then requested 
information on the jurisdiction of the case. The judge requested 
the information because of a question regarding the language of 
subsection 76-10-1801(2). Id. The trial judge ruled that because 
of the amount in question, the subsection required the charges to 
be felonies rather than misdemeanors. Since the Circuit Court had 
no jurisdiction to hear felonies, the trial judge dismissed the 
charges. (Docket, supra at 4) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY DISMISSED THE 
CHARGES BECAUSE HIS INTERPRETATION OF § 76-10-
1801 DENIES THE PROSECUTOR DISCRETION TO 
DETERMINE WHICH CHARGES TO FILE, IN VIOLATION 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The trial judge improperly dismissed the charges against 
Norris because the application of § 76-10-1801 denies the 
prosecutor discretion to determine which charges to file. This 
violates Article V of the Utah Constitution, which guarantees 
separation of powers. See State v. Bell, 785 P. 2d 390, 404 (Utah 
1989) . Prosecutorial discretion is recognized as an integral part 
of the criminal justice system, and judges cannot override the 
legitimate decisions of a prosecutor. See Bordenkircher v. Haves, 
434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); State v. Garcia, 29 Utah 2d 52, 53, 504 
P.2d 1015-16 (1972). Prosecutorial discretion is so vital to the 
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criminal justice system it enjoys constitutional protection. The 
trial judge's interpretation of § 76-10-1801 ignores that 
protection. 
The trial judge's interpretation violates Article V of the 
Utah Constitution, which guarantees separation of powers amongst 
the co-equal departments of government. Judges are not permitted 
to override the legitimate decisions of prosecutors, nor can the 
legislature remove discretion altogether. See Bell, 785 P.2d at 
404; State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Utah 1978). 
Prosecutorial discretion operates within limits set by laws 
defining crimes and acceptable punishments, by case law 
interpreting those laws, and by procedural and constitutional 
requirements. However, a total elimination of discretion is 
impermissible under Article V. The trial judge held that § 76-10-
1801 denied the prosecutor any choice over which charges to file. 
That interpretation is an unconstitutional intrusion into the realm 
of prosecutorial discretion. 
The trial judge had no authority to override the prosecutor's 
decision to file misdemeanor charges against Norris, and thus the 
dismissal was improper. The decision denied the prosecutor 
discretion violated the separation of powers guarantee in the Utah 
Constitution. Since the trial judge exceeded the bounds of his 
authority, and violated the state constitution, his decision should 
be reversed. 
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II. THE LANGUAGE OF § 76-10-1801(2) DOES NOT LIMIT 
THE PROSECUTOR'S DISCRETION, BECAUSE IT ALLOWS 
THE PROSECUTION TO CHARGE A DEFENDANT FOR AN 
ENTIRE FRAUD SCHEME. 
The prosecutor's discretion remains unfettered by the language 
of § 76-10-1801(2). That subsection does not restrict the 
prosecutor; it actually provides greater prosecutorial discretion 
by authorizing prosecution based on an entire fraud scheme. 
Subsection 76-10-1801(2) states that the degree of the offense 
"shall be measured by the total value . . . obtained or sought to 
be obtained by the scheme . . . ." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801(2) 
(Supp. 1995) . The trial judge interpreted this statement to mean 
that all discretion to choose what charge to file was eliminated, 
and dismissed the charge because of that interpretation. As has 
been discussed, that interpretation exceeded the judge's 
constitutional authority. 
Subsection 76-10-1801(2) closes avenues for the defendant, not 
the prosecutor. First, the subsection prohibits the defendant from 
arguing that each separate transaction be treated as a separate 
offense. Second, the prosecution is based on the amount of money 
or property involved in the entire scheme, which prohibits the 
defendant from arguing that the charge be based on the amount 
actually involved. Third, the subsection focuses the prosecution 
on the fraudulent scheme, not the amount of money that was actually 
involved. Section 76-10-1801 prohibits the devising and 
communicating of a fraudulent scheme, not the taking of money or 
property. Subsection two reinforces that mandate by permitting 
5 
prosecution based on the potential scope of the fraud scheme, not 
the amounts actually obtained by it. 
The trial judge's decision to dismiss the charge was thus 
based on an unwarranted interpretation of § 76-10-1801(2). That 
subsection was not intended to shackle prosecutors, but to enhance 
their ability to effectively prosecute those who violate the law. 
The trial judge failed to see the purpose of subsection two, and 
chose instead an unconstitutional denial of prosecutorial 
discretion. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY DISMISSED THE 
CHARGES BECAUSE HIS INTERPRETATION OF § 76-10-
1801 DENIES THE PROSECUTOR DISCRETION TO 
DETERMINE WHICH CHARGES TO FILE, IN VIOLATION 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The trial judge improperly dismissed the charges because his 
interpretation of § 76-10-1801 denies the prosecutor discretion to 
determine which charge to file. This violates Article V of the 
Utah Constitution, which guarantees separation of powers. w[Utah] 
has long recognized the vital role of the prosecution and the 
importance of affording that body the discretion, within 
permissible limits, to exercise its function. Certainly, we are 
compelled . . . to recognize this discretion as it preserves the 
constitutional concept of separation of powers." State v. Bell, 
785 P.2d 390, 404 (Utah 1989). Prosecutorial discretion is 
recognized as an integral part of the criminal justice system, and 
judges cannot override the legitimate decisions of a prosecutor. 
uIt is not a function of the courts to review the exercise of 
executive discretion . . . ." State v. Garcia, 29 Utah 2d 52, 53, 
504 P.2d 1015-16 (1972). 
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the 
importance of allowing prosecutors substantial discretion to 
determine what charges to file. u [T]he decision whether or not to 
prosecute, and what charges to file . . ., generally rests within 
[the prosecutor's] discretion. . . . [T]he conscious exercise of 
some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal 
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constitutional violation." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 
364 (1978) . Prosecutorial discretion is so vital to the criminal 
justice system it enjoys constitutional protection. The trial 
judge's interpretation of § 76-10-1801 ignores that protection. 
The trial judge's interpretation of § 76-10-1801 is 
unconstitutional. Article V of the Utah Constitution guarantees 
separation of state power amongst three distinct, co-equal 
departments. u[N]o person charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to one of the[] departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the others . . . ." UTAH CONST. 
art. V. As has been stated, the separation of powers guarantee 
preserves prosecutorial discretion. See Bell, 785 P.2d at 404. 
The trial judge could not override the prosecutor's legitimate 
decisions, nor could the legislature remove discretion from the 
prosecutor altogether. w [D]iscretion rests in the prosecutor in 
every case . . . . Some selectivity is always permitted . . . ." 
State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Utah 1978); see also Bell, 
785 P. 2d at 404. The legislature may impose limits to the 
prosecutor's discretion by defining the crime and the acceptable 
penalties; and the judiciary may limit discretion through statutory 
interpretation, procedural rules and constitutional requirements, 
but a total elimination of discretion is impermissible under 
Article V. The trial judge held that § 76-10-1801 denied the 
prosecutor any choice over which charges to file. That 
interpretation is an unconstitutional intrusion into the realm of 
the prosecutor's legitimate discretion. 
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Legitimate prosecutorial decisions are protected and 
authorized by Article V of the Utah Constitution. These decisions 
include authority to choose which charges to file. The prosecutor 
may choose to file a charge lesser than that justified by the fact 
situation. The prosecutor could determine that a particular charge 
would not be appropriate, although warranted by the facts. 
Finally, the prosecutor could choose to reduce or drop the charges 
as part of a plea bargain agreement. In this case, the trial 
judge's interpretation of § 76-10-1801 prohibited the prosecutor 
from making those choices. Thus, that interpretation is 
unconstitutional, and the judge's decision to dismiss the charges 
against Norris should be reversed. 
The trial judge impermissibly overrode the prosecutor's 
decision to file misdemeanor charges against Norris, and thus the 
dismissal was improper. That decision denied the prosecutor 
discretion and violated the separation of powers guarantee in the 
Utah Constitution. Since the trial judge based his decision to 
dismiss the charge on his incorrect and unconstitutional 
interpretation of § 76-10-1801, the dismissal must be reversed. 
II. THE LANGUAGE OF § 76-10-1801(2) DOES NOT LIMIT 
THE PROSECUTOR'S DISCRETION, BECAUSE IT ALLOWS 
THE PROSECUTION OF AN ENTIRE FRAUD SCHEME. 
The prosecutor's discretion remains unfettered by the language 
of § 76-10-1801(2). That subsection does not restrict the 
prosecutor, because it allows prosecution based on an entire fraud 
scheme rather than individual transactions. Section 76-10-1801(2) 
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states that the degree of the offense "shall be measured by the 
total value . . . obtained or sought to be obtained by the scheme 
. . . ." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801(2) (Supp. 1995). The trial 
judge wrongly and unconstitutionally interpreted this statement as 
eliminating any discretion to determine what charge to file against 
Norris. 
That subsection closes avenues for the defendant, not the 
prosecution. First, subsection 1801(2) prohibits the defendant 
from arguing that each separate transaction be treated as a 
separate offense. For example, suppose a defendant sought to 
defraud a victim out of $2,000, by obtaining 20 payments of $100 
apiece. Without subsection two, the defendant could argue that the 
degree of the offense should be based on one transaction, and is 
only a class B misdemeanor. With subsection two, the entire scheme 
becomes the basis of the charge, which is a third degree felony. 
Secondly, subsection two allows prosecution for an entire 
fraud scheme, even though the scheme has not been completed. This 
prevents a defendant from arguing that only a small amount of money 
or property was actually obtained. The criminal act that the 
statute prohibits is devising and communicating "any scheme or 
artifice to defraud another or to obtain . . . money, property, or 
anything of value by means of fraud . . . ." Id. § 76-10-1801(1) . 
Actually obtaining the money is not necessary, only devising and 
communicating a scheme to obtain the money. Subsection two 
prevents a defendant from arguing that only a small amount of money 
or property had actually been involved. In this way, the 
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fraudulent scheme may be appropriately punished and adequately 
deterred. 
Subsection two also directs the focus of the prosecution on 
the fraudulent scheme, not on the money that is involved. Those 
who perpetrate fraud schemes hide their gains from official 
documentation. Because records are nonexistent or unreliable in 
fraudulent transactions, it may be difficult to adequately prove 
how much money or property was actually involved. Under subsection 
two, the prosecution chooses the appropriate charge based on the 
existence of a fraud scheme and the total amount sought. 
Subsection two thus focuses the attention on preventing and 
punishing the crime of devising and communicating a fraudulent 
scheme, even if no money changed hands. 
To conclude, the trial judge's interpretation of subsection 
76-10-1801(2) was incorrect. That subsection does not eliminate 
the prosecutor's discretion, but it does eliminate the defendant's 
arguments blunting the impact of the law. Subsection two prevents 
a defendant from undermining the effect of the law by removing the 
possibility that the charge be based on individual transactions or 
on the money or property actually involved or proven to be 
involved. Subsection 76-10-1801(2) enables the law to adequately 
deter people from devising and communicating a fraud scheme, and 
appropriately punish those who do. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial judge improperly dismissed the charges against 
Norris. The dismissal was based on an unconstitutional and 
improper interpretation of § 76-10-1801. Article V of the Utah 
Constitution requires prosecutorial discretion as part of the 
separation of powers guarantee. A prosecutor has discretion over 
which charges to file, and judges are not permitted to override the 
legitimate decisions of a prosecutor. The trial judge's 
interpretation of § 76-10-1801 unconstitutionally denied the 
prosecutor discretion to determine what charges to file. Since the 
dismissal was based on this unconstitutional interpretation, the 
decision to dismiss must be reversed, and the prosecution allowed 
to continue. 
Section 76-10-1801(2) does not limit a prosecutor's 
discretion. Rather, it removes a defendant's arguments for 
escaping or blunting the impact of the law. The crime that the law 
prohibits is devising and communicating a fraudulent scheme. 
Subsection two enhances the prosecution of violations by preventing 
defendants from arguing that the charges be based on separate 
transactions, or on the actual amounts of money or property 
involved. Subsection two enables the law to adequately deter 
people from violating the law, and appropriately punish those who 
do. 
The trial judge failed to recognize these purposes for 
subsection two, and determined instead that it eliminated all 
discretion to determine which charges to file. That interpretation 
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is unconstitutional, because it violates Article V of the Utah 
Constitution. For this reason, the judge's decision to dismiss the 
charges against Richard Norris must be reversed, and the 
prosecution against him allowed to continue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of June, 1996 
ELLIOT R. LAURENCE 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This certifies that a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
was mailed to the following address: 
C. Danny Frazier 
Attorney for Richard Norris 
8 N. Center 
Box 727 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
The trial court appointed Mr. Frazier as counsel for Richard Norris 
on April 19, 1996. 
DATED this 21st day of June, 1996. 
Addenda 
Order Dismissing Case, West Valley City v. Norris, Feb. 5, 1996. 
Docket, West Valley City v. Norris, June 6, 1996. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (Supp. 1995). 
Utah Constitution article V, § 1 
ADDENDUM 1: 
Order Dismissing Case, West Valley City v. Norris, Feb 5, 1996 
D O C K E T Page 4 
CIRCUIT COURT - WVC THURSDAY FEBRUARY 22, 1996 
11:41 AM 
,/ndant Citation: WVC Case: 941004929 MC 
Agency No.: WVC 
NORRIS, RICHARD F City Misdemeanor 
J2/05/96 TAPE: 13 874 COUNT: 142 SMT 
Deft not present SMT 
ATD: MADDOX, DAVID PRO: STONEY, KEITH SMT 
WEST VALLEY CITY VS RICHARD NORRIS IS BEFORE THE COURT ON A SMT 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE INITIAL INFORMATION AS VOID ON THE BASIS SMT 
IT IS LACKING SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO ADVISE THE DEFENDANT SMT 
OF PERSONS ALLEGED DEFRAUDED AND THE SCHEME OR ARTIFICE SMT 
UTILIZED, PRECLUDING ABILITY TO PREPARE A DEFENSE. THE MOTION SMT 
TO STRIKE WAS FILED SUBSEQUENT TO A DEFENSE REQUEST FOR A BILL SMT 
OF PARTICULARS. THE CITY PROSECUTOR FILED AN AMENDED INFOR- SMT 
MATION. THEREAFTER, THE DEFENSE FILED A MOTION TO QUASH THE SMT 
AMENDED INFORMATION ALLEGING AN INVALID OR VOID INITIAL SMT 
INFORMATION CANNOT BE AMENDED CHARGING CRIMES NOW BARRED BY THE SMT 
RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. THE COURT RECEIVED SMT 
MEMORANDUMS FROM BOTH PARTIES. IN PROCESS OF REVIEWING THE SMT 
VOLUMINOUS PAPERWORK SUBMITTED BY THE CITY, THE COURT BECAME SMT 
CONCERNED WHETHER IT WAS EXAMINING MATERIAL THAT MAY NEVER SMT 
BE ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL OF THE CASE AND MAY SMT 
REQUIRE THE COURT TO RECUSE ITSELF FOR EXAMINING SUCH INVESTI- SMT 
GATIVE MATERIAL. AS IT ALWAYS DOES, IN REVIEWING A CASE, THE SMT 
COURT REVIEWED TO CONFIRM JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. THE SMT 
STATUTE 76-10-1801,U.C.A, 1953, AS AMENDED, UNDER WHICH THE SMT 
OFFENSES ARE CHARGED, INDICATES IN SUBPARAGRAPH TWO (2) SMT 
THEREOF, "THE DETERMINATION OF THE DEGREE OF ANY OFFENSE SMT 
UNDER SUBSECTION (1) SHALL BE MEASURED BY THE TOTAL VALUE SMT 
OF ALL PROPERTY, MONEY, OR THINGS OBTAINED OR SOUGHT TO BE SMT 
OBTAINED BY THE SCHEME OR ARTIFICE DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION SMT 
(1) . . . " THE INITIAL INFORMATION IS SILENT AS TO THE NUMBER SMT 
OF VICTIMS AND MEASURE OF VALUE. THE AMENDED INFORAMTION NAMES SMT 
FOUR VICTIMS IN FOUR COUNTS AND MEASURES VALUE OF MORE THAN SMT 
$3 00 IN EACH COUNT. ON JANUARY 4, 1996, THE COURT SENT A SMT 
LETTER TO BOTH PARTIES, MR DAVID MADDOX FOR THE DEFENSE AND SMT 
MR KEITH STONEY FOR THE PROSECUTION, REQUESTING INPUT IF THEY SMT 
DESIRED, ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION. RESPONSE WAS RECEIVED SMT 
FROM THE DEFENSE. NONE WAS RECEIVED FROM THE CITY FOR THE SMT 
COURT'S REVIEW PRIOR TO MAKING ITS DECISION THIS 5TH DAY OF SMT 
FEBRUARY 19 96. IN AN ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF SMT 
JURISDICTION, THE COURT REVIEWED SOME OF THE INVESTIGATIVE SMT 
MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY THE CITY AND DETERMINED THE $1000 SMT 
JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT FOR CIRCUIT COURT JURISDICTION HAD BEEN SMT 
EXCEEDED. FOR EXAMPLE, A LETTER OF DEMAND FROM DEFENDANT SMT 
NORRIS TO A SINGLE VICTIM OF FOUR ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION SMT 
DEMANDS $1,600. THEREFORE, THE COURT FINDS THE CIRCUIT SMT 
COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OF THE FELONIOUS ACTIONS ALLEGED SMT 
IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION. AS A RESULT, THE COURT DOES NOT SMT 
REACH THE ISSUE OF STRIKING THE INITIAL INFORMATION FOR SMT 
VOIDNESS OR THE ISSUE TO QUASH THE AMENDED INFORMATION FOR SMT 
RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS RAISED BY THE DEFENSE. SMT 
02/06/96 C/O THE CASE DISMISSED. SMT 
960250227 Refund of bail. ,. . CHK #:011474 2000.00 IHR 
GAYLENE FOWLER," PAYOR""OF/CASH,BAIlt, JIECIEVED CASH BAIL REFUND IHR 
ADDENDUM 2: 
Docket, West Valley City v. Norris, June 6, 1996 
D O C K E T 
IIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
>fendant 
WVC 
Citation: 
Page 1 
THURSDAY JUNE 6, 1996 
1:54 PM 
WVC Case: 941004929 MC 
Agency No.: WVC 
NORRIS, RICHARD F 
3392 WEST 3500 SOUTH 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119 
City Misdemeanor 
Judge: EDWARD A. WATSON 
NO OTN # FOR THIS CASE 
larges 
Violation Date: 05/12/94 
1. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
Sev: MA 
2. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
Sev: MA 
3. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
Sev: MA 
4. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
Sev: MA 
76-10-1801 
76-10-1801 
76-10-1801 
76-10-1801 
Bail 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
roceedings 
>/20/94 Case filed on 12/20/94. JLB 
Warrant ordered JLB 
WARRANT OF ARREST issued - JUDGE WBB JLB 
Other: city warrant of arrest JLB 
Bail amount ordered: 2000.00 JLB 
2/28/94 Warrant recalled on 12/28/94 because Booked LJB 
2/29/94 942540092 Bail posted ========> check 2000.00 IHR 
Posted by: GAYLENE FOWLER IHR 
5093 WEST LONGMORE DR IHR 
SLC UT IHR 
2/30/94 ARR scheduled for 12/30/94 at 9:16 A in room 1 with EAW SWU 
Mis Arraignment JUDGE: EDWARD A. WATSON SMT 
TAPE: 12 54 6 COUNT: 348 6 SMT 
ATD: None Present PRO: None Present SMT 
Deft is not present SMT 
PTC 
Chrg: 
Chrg: 
Chrg: 
Chrg: 
scheduled for 01/26/95 at 0900 A in room 1 with EAW SMT 
76-10-1801 
76-10-1801 
76-10-1801 
76-10-1801 
Plea: Not Guilty SMT 
Plea: Not Guilty SMT 
Plea: Not Guilty SMT 
Plea: Not Guilty SMT 
DON BYBEE WAS PRESENT FOR DEF AN ENTERED NG PLEA. SMT 
CASH BAIL WILL REMAIN AT $2000 CASH. SMT 
FILED RECEIPT OF CASH BAIL PAID $2000 RECEIPT 04727 LJB 
THE DEF CAME TO THE COURT WITH HIS ATTY, DON BYBEE, TO REQUEST SMT 
A RETURN OF THE CASH BAIL. THE COURT ORDERED THE BAIL CHANGED SMT 
TO BOND. UPON POSTING OF $2000 BOND, THE CASH BAIL MAY BE SMT 
RETURNED TO THE DEF. SMT 
1/26/95 Hearing (PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE): JUDGE: EDWARD A. WATSON SMT 
TAPE: 12 631 COUNT: 682 SMT 
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L/26/95 Deft Present SMT 
ATD: None Present PRO: CLARK, DAVID SMT 
PTC scheduled for 02/16/95 at 0900 A in room 1 with EAW SMT 
DON BYBEE WAS GRANTED PERMISSION TO WITHDRAW. GILBERT ATHAY SMT 
WILL REPRESENT ATTY. PTC WAS CONTINUED. SMT 
2/01/95 FILED: APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - D MEL 
GILBERT ATHAY MEL 
FILED: REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - D GILBERT ATHAY MEL 
2/02/95 FILED - 1-25-95 - NOTICE AND ORDER OF WITHDRAWAL BY ATTY SDS 
DON L. BYBEE. SDS 
2/16/95 Hearing (PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE): JUDGE: EDWARD A. WATSON SMT 
TAPE: 12 689 COUNT: 58 SMT 
Deft Present SMT 
ATD: ATHAY, D. GILBERT PRO: CLARK, DAVID SMT 
PTC scheduled for 03/29/95 at 0900 A in room 1 with EAW SMT 
PTC WAS CONTINUED. SMT 
3/14/95 *******NOTE: CASH BAIL OF $2000.00 BEING HELD ON THIS CASE***** IHR 
3/29/95 Hearing (PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE): JUDGE: EDWARD A. WATSON SMT 
TAPE: 128 31 COUNT: 14 3 0 SMT 
Deft Present SMT 
ATD: ATHAY, D. GILBERT PRO: CLARK, DAVID SMT 
TRJ scheduled for 04/20/95 at 0900 A in room 1 with EAW SMT 
PTC WAS HELD. THERE WAS NO RESOLUITON. TRJ WAS SET. REQUESTED SMT 
VOIR DIRE AND INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE DUE 4-13-95. SMT 
1/10/95 FILED: MOTION BY CITY FOR CONTINUANCE. SMT 
1/13/95 TRJ on 4/20/95 was cancelled SDS 
1/14/95 NOTE: TRJ RESET TO 5-8-95 AT 9 AM - MAILED NOTICE TO SDS 
ATD-D. GILBERT ATHAY AND TO CITY ATTYS OFFICE. SDS 
TRJ scheduled for 5/ 8/95 at 9:00 A in room 1 with EAW SDS 
1/18/95 Accepted distribution CF $ 4.00 from Misc. Payments screen DSW 
5/02/95 FILED: MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE - D GILBERT ATHAY MEL 
5/08/95 NOTE: JUDGE RESET TRJ TO 6-8-95 AT 9 AM, MAILED NEW NOTICE TO SDS 
ATTY ATHAYS OFFICE AND TO CITY ATTYS OFFICE. SDS 
TRJ rescheduled to 6/ 8/95 at 9:00 A in room 1 with EAW SDS 
5/01/9 5 FILED: MOTION TO WITHDRAW - D GILBERT ATHAY MEL 
5/02/95 NOTE: JUDGE WATSON HAS ALLOWED ATTY ATHAY TO WITHDRAW AS SDS 
COUNSEL TO DEFENDANT. SDS 
5/05/95 NOTE; CALLED ATTY ATHAY'S OFFICE AND INFORMED SECRETARTY JO SDS 
THAT THE JUDGE WILL NOT CONTINUE TRJ FROM 6-8-95 AND WILL NOT SDS 
SIGN THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW FROM ATTY ATHAY UNTIL ANOTHER SDS 
ATTY IS PREPARED TO GO FORTH WITH THE JURY ON 6-8-95. SDS 
5/07/95 NOTE: ON 6-7-95 - JUDGE WATSON SIGNED THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW SDS 
ON ATTY ATHAY - AND CONTINUED THE TRJ TO 7-12-95 - TALKED WITH SDS 
ATTY MADDOX AND HE STATED THAT 7-12-95 WOULD BE FINE WITH HIM. SDS 
ATTY MADDOX HAS A PREVIOUS COMMITMENT ON 7-10-95. SDS 
TRJ rescheduled to 7/12/95 at 9:00 A in room 1 with EAW SDS 
5/12/95 *******NOTE, DEF HAS CASH BAIL OF $2000 BEING HELD ON THIS ***** IHR 
5/15/95 FILED: APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL - DAVID MADDOX MEL 
5/2 6/95 FILED: REQUEST FOR FILL OF PARTICULARS - DAVID MADDOX MEL 
7/07/95 FILED: REQUEST FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS - DAVID MADDOX MEL 
7/10/95 TRJ on 7/12/95 was cancelled SMT 
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'/10/95 TRIAL WAS CONTINUED AT THE REQUEST OF THE DEF ATTY. SMT 
FILED: FAX FROM ATTY MADDOX REQUESTING A CONTINUANCE. SMT 
'/11/95 FILED: MOTION TO DISMISS OR CONTINUE - DAVID MADDOX MEL 
713/95 FILED: LETTER FROM DEF'S ATTY, DAVID MADDOX IHR 
714/95 TRJ scheduled for 9/14/95 at 9:00 A in room 1 with EAW SMT 
724/95 *****NOTE: CASH BAIL OF $2000 BEING HELD ON THIS CASE********* IHR 
707/95 NOTE: TRJ CONT TO 10-26-95 AT 9 AM, MAILED NEW NOTICE TO SDS 
ATTY MADDOX AND TO CITY ATTYS OFFICE. SDS 
TRJ rescheduled to 10/26/95 at 9:00 A in room 1 with EAW SDS 
)/04/95 FILED: AMENDED INFORMATION DOA 
)/23/95 FILED REQUEST OR ORAL ARGUMENTS & EXPEDITED HEARING LJB 
FILED MOTION TO QUASH AMENDED INFORMATION AND STRIKE THE LJB 
INFORMATION ON FILE LJB 
FILED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE AMENDED LJB 
INFORMATION LJB 
FILED AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE AMENDED LJB 
INFORMATION LJB 
J/24/95 NOTE; JUDGE SPOKE WITH ATTY MADDOX AS WELL AS ATTY STONEY SDS 
JURY TRL WILL BE SET ASIDE, AND WE WILL HAVE THE ORAL ARGUMENTS SDS 
AND MO HRGS IN ITS PLACE. LET ATTY STONEY KNOW AS WELL AS SDS 
ATTY MADDOX. SDS 
TRJ on 10/26/95 was cancelled SDS 
HRG scheduled for 10/26/95 at 9:00 A in room 1 with EAW SDS 
D/2 6/95 Hearing: JUDGE: EDWARD A. WATSON SMT 
TAPE: 13529 COUNT: 1540 SMT 
Deft Present SMT 
ATD: MADDOX, DAVID PRO: STONEY, KEITH SMT 
1781 - ATTY MADDOX ARGUED HIS MOTION TO QUASH AMENDED INFORMA- SMT 
TION AND STRIKE THE INFORMATION ON FILE. SMT 
C2 3 00 - ATTY STONEY RESPONDED SMT 
C3371 - COURT FOUND THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION IS DEFECTIVE. SMT 
THE COURT WILL ALLOW THE ATTORNEYS TIME TO PRESENT MEMORANDA SMT 
AS TO WHETHER THE AMENDED INFORMATION IS ACTUALLY A NEW SMT 
INFORMATION AND IS THEREFORE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF SMT 
LIMITATIONS. SMT 
DEF WILL HAVE 10 DAYS TO PREPARE MEMO. PROSECUTOR WILL HAVE SMT 
10 DAYS TO RESPOND. DEF WILL THEN HAVE AN ADDITIONAL 5 DAYS SMT 
TO RESPOND. SMT 
L/09/95 FILED MEMORANDUM LJB 
L/16/95 *****CASH BAIL OF $2000 BEING HELD ON THIS CASE********** IHR 
1/27/95 NOTE: REPLY MEMORANDUM FILED BY WEST VALLEY CITY. SDS 
2/27/95 FILED; NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION - DAVID MADDOX CCE 
2/28/95 FILED MOTION TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION LJB 
1/05/96 LETTER MAILED TO BOTH ATTYS MADDOX AND STONEY REQUESTING SMT 
INFORMATION REGARDING JURISDICTION OF THIS CASE. SMT 
1/23/96 FILED: LETTER FROM DEF'S ATTY, DAVID MADDOX IHR 
1/25/96 NOTE: *****CASH BAIL OF $2000 BEING HELD ON THIS CASE******** IHR 
2/01/96 HRG scheduled for 2/ 5/96 at 10:30 A in room 1 with EAW SMT 
2/05/96 FILED: REPLY TO JUDGES REQUEST FOR RESPONSE REGARDING DOA 
DEGREE OF OFFENSE NOTE: WAS BROUGHT OVER FROM CITY ON 2/2/96 DOA 
Hearing: JUDGE: EDWARD A. WATSON SMT 
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J/05/96 142 TAPE: 13874 COUNT: 
Deft not present 
ATD: MADDOX, DAVID PRO: STONEY, KEITH 
WEST VALLEY CITY VS RICHARD NORRIS IS BEFORE THE COURT ON A 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE INITIAL INFORMATION AS VOID ON THE BASIS 
IT IS LACKING SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO ADVISE THE DEFENDANT 
OF PERSONS ALLEGED DEFRAUDED AND THE SCHEME OR ARTIFICE 
UTILIZED, PRECLUDING ABILITY TO PREPARE A DEFENSE. THE MOTION 
TO STRIKE WAS FILED SUBSEQUENT TO A DEFENSE REQUEST FOR A BILL 
OF PARTICULARS. THE CITY PROSECUTOR FILED AN AMENDED INFOR-
MATION. THEREAFTER, THE DEFENSE FILED A MOTION TO QUASH THE 
AMENDED INFORMATION ALLEGING AN INVALID OR VOID INITIAL 
INFORMATION CANNOT BE AMENDED CHARGING CRIMES NOW BARRED BY THE 
RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. THE COURT RECEIVED 
MEMORANDUMS FROM BOTH PARTIES. IN PROCESS OF REVIEWING THE 
VOLUMINOUS PAPERWORK SUBMITTED BY THE CITY, THE COURT BECAME 
CONCERNED WHETHER IT WAS EXAMINING MATERIAL THAT MAY NEVER 
BE ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL OF THE CASE AND MAY 
REQUIRE THE COURT TO RECUSE ITSELF FOR EXAMINING SUCH INVESTI-
GATIVE MATERIAL. AS IT ALWAYS DOES, IN REVIEWING A CASE, THE 
COURT REVIEWED TO CONFIRM JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. THE 
STATUTE 76-10-1801,U.C.A, 1953, AS AMENDED, UNDER WHICH THE 
OFFENSES ARE CHARGED, INDICATES IN SUBPARAGRAPH TWO (2) 
THEREOF, "THE DETERMINATION OF THE DEGREE OF ANY OFFENSE 
UNDER SUBSECTION (1) SHALL BE MEASURED BY THE TOTAL VALUE 
OF ALL PROPERTY, MONEY, OR THINGS OBTAINED OR SOUGHT TO BE 
OBTAINED BY THE SCHEME OR ARTIFICE DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION 
(1) . . . " THE INITIAL INFORMATION IS SILENT AS TO THE NUMBER 
OF VICTIMS AND MEASURE OF VALUE. THE AMENDED INFORAMTION NAMES 
FOUR VICTIMS IN FOUR COUNTS AND MEASURES VALUE OF MORE THAN 
$3 00 IN EACH COUNT. ON JANUARY 4, 1996, THE COURT SENT A 
LETTER TO BOTH PARTIES, MR DAVID MADDOX FOR THE DEFENSE AND 
MR KEITH STONEY FOR THE PROSECUTION, REQUESTING INPUT IF THEY 
DESIRED, ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION. RESPONSE WAS RECEIVED 
FROM THE DEFENSE. NONE WAS RECEIVED FROM THE CITY FOR THE 
COURT'S REVIEW PRIOR TO MAKING ITS DECISION THIS 5TH DAY OF 
FEBRUARY 1996. IN AN ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF 
JURISDICTION, THE COURT REVIEWED SOME OF THE INVESTIGATIVE 
MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY THE CITY AND DETERMINED THE $1000 
JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT FOR CIRCUIT COURT JURISDICTION HAD BEEN 
EXCEEDED. FOR EXAMPLE, A LETTER OF DEMAND FROM DEFENDANT 
NORRIS TO A SINGLE VICTIM OF FOUR ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION 
DEMANDS $1,600. THEREFORE, THE COURT FINDS THE CIRCUIT 
COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OF THE FELONIOUS ACTIONS ALLEGED 
IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION. AS A RESULT, THE COURT DOES NOT 
REACH THE ISSUE OF STRIKING THE INITIAL INFORMATION FOR 
VOIDNESS OR THE ISSUE TO QUASH THE AMENDED INFORMATION FOR 
RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS RAISED BY THE DEFENSE. 
/06/96 C/O THE CASE DISMISSED. 
960250227 Refund of bail CHK #:011474 2000.00 
GAYLENE FOWLER, PAYOR OF CASH BAIL, RECIEVED CASH BAIL REFUND 
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City Misdemeanor 
2/06/96 OF $2000 OVER THE COUNTER THIS DATE 
Chrg: 76-10-1801 Find: Dismissed 
Chrg: 76-10-1801 Find: Dismissed 
Chrg: 76-10-1801 Find: Dismissed 
Chrg: 76-10-1801 Find: Dismissed 
Entered case disposition of: Dismissed 
2/07/96 FILED: WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL 
3/05/96 FILED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
CERTIFIED COPY OF NOTICE OF APPEAL SENT TO COURT OF APPEALS 
3/14/96 FILED: CERTIFICATE OF MAILING FROM WV CITY 
3/15/96 FILED: REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT. ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH ALAN SMITH 
TO PREPARE. TAPES COPIED AND MR SMITH NOTIFIED. 
3/19/96 FILED: LETTER FROM COURT OF APPEALS CASE NO IS 960151CA 
FILED: CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ADDRESS CORRECTED ADDRESS 
IS NOT 3392 WEST 3500 SOUTH WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH 84119 
3/22/96 FILED: TRANSCRIPT 
4/08/96 FILED IMPECUNIOUS AFFIDAVIT REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
COPY SENT TO COURT OF APPEALS 
4/11/96 PAULETTE, COURT OF APPEALS, SAID JUDGE WATSON SHOULD RULE ON 
THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL. HAD THE REQUEST BEEN SENT TO THE 
COURT OF APPEALS, THE FILE WOULD HAVE BEEN TEMPORARILY 
REMANDED TO THIS COURT FOR RULING. 
FILED UNSIGNED ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC DEFENDER 
4/18/96 HRG scheduled for 4/19/96 at 9:30 A in room 1 with EAW 
4/19/96 Hearing: JUDGE: EDWARD A. WATSON 
TAPE: 14106 COUNT: 1343 
Deft Present 
ATD: None Present PRO: None Present 
THE COURT FOUND DEF IS INDIGENT AND APPOINTED BRUCE LARSEN, 
CITY'S PUBLIC DEFENDER. DEF SAID THERE IS A CONFLICT WITH 
MR LARSEN'S OFFICE. COURT APPOINTED THE CONFLICT ATTY, DANNY 
FRAZIER. 
4/30/96 SENT FILE TO COURT OF APPEALS 
ccounting Summary 
Citation Amount: 
IHR 
IHR 
IHR 
IHR 
IHR 
IHR 
IHR 
LJB 
LJB 
DOA 
CLN 
CLN 
LJB 
LJB 
LJB 
LJB 
LJB 
LJB 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
LJB 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
SMT 
LJB 
Trust Account Posted 
2000.00 
Applied Refunded 
2000.00 
Payable 
Cash 
dditional Case Data 
Sentence Summary 
1. COMM FRAUD 
2. COMM FRAUD 
3. COMM FRAUD 
4. COMM FRAUD 
Plea: Not Guilty 
Plea: Not Guilty 
Plea: Not Guilty 
Plea: Not Guilty 
Find: Dismissed 
Find: Dismissed 
Find: Dismissed 
Find: Dismissed 
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WVC Case: 941004929 MC 
Agency No.: WVC 
City Misdemeanor 
Case Disposition 
Disposition, Dismissed DATE: 02/06/96 
Parties 
Payor 
GAYLENE FOWLER 
509 3 WEST LONGMORE DR 
SLC UT 
Atty for Defendant 
ATHAY, D. GILBERT 
7 2 EAST 4TH SOUTH, 
SUITE 325 
SALT LAKE CITY 
Work Phone: ( ) 
UT 841110000 
Home Phone: ( 
Work Phone: ( 
Atty for Defendant 
MADDOX, DAVID R. 
488 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
SUITE 120 
MURRAY UT 841070000 
Home Phone: ( 
Work Phone: ( 
Personal Description 
Sex: M DOB: 05/15/55 
Dr. Lie. No.: 0 
Scheduled Hearing Summary 
ARRAIGNMENT 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
HEARINGS ON MOTIONS 
DECISION 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNS 
State: UT Exp 
on 
on 
on 
on 
on 
on 
on 
12/30/94 
01/26/95 
02/16/95 
03/29/95 
10/26/95 
02/05/96 
04/19/96 
ires: 
0916 
0900 
0900 
0900 
0900 
1030 
0930 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
in 
in 
in 
in 
in 
in 
in 
room 
room 
room 
room 
room 
room 
room 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
with 
with 
with 
with 
with 
with 
with 
EAW 
EAW 
EAW 
EAW 
EAW 
EAW 
EAW 
End of the docket report for this case. 
ADDENDUM 3: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (Supp. 1995). 
76-10-1801. Communications fraud - Elements - Penalties. 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain from 
another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly 
with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice 
is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sought 
to be obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud is other than 
the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be measured 
by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained by the 
scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense described 
in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in Subsection (1) to 
permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessary element 
of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing a scheme 
or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of communication fraud. 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey, make 
known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, telephone, 
telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, representations, 
promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, 
or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
ADDENDUM 4: 
Utah Constitution article V, § 1. 
ARTICLE V 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
Section 1. [Three departments of government.] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the 
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions 
appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
